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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
THROUGH THEIR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES
Plaintiff steamship line, a Greek corporation, filed a libel in personam
in Federal District Court for the District of Columbia against the
Republic of Tunisia for unpaid demurrage allegedly accrued on plain-
tiff's ship while it was in Tunisian waters. Summons was issued to the
Tunisian government, to be served upon its agent, the Tunisian Ambas-
sador to the United States. Although no evidence established that the
Ambassador had personally declined service, defendant United States
Marshal returned the summons unexecuted, with the explanation that
"the within named principal agent, having Diplomatic Immunity, and
being listed on the Diplomatic List of the State Department, cannot be
served at Washington, D.C."' Plaintiff then sought a writ of mandamus
to compel service. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dis-
miss. On appeal, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
affirmed. Held: Mandamus does not lie to compel a United States
Marshal to serve summons upon an agent of a foreign government
who is eligible for diplomatic immunity, even though the summons
would include the diplomat only in his capacity as agent of his sending
state, and not as a party defendant. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore,
345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Procedural rules require a Marshal to execute service of summons
notwithstanding his notice of defenses which the intended recipient
may interpose to defeat the action.' Nevertheless, a Marshal will not be
compelled to execute a service of summons which would violate diplo-
matic immunity; such a violation, if it resulted in distraint of the
person or property of an ambassador or minister would be punishable
as a crime.' It has been held that the diplomatic immunity of an
ambassador is violated by service of process which names him as a
1 Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
" Any other rule would make the Marshal a judge of the merits of the case, as he is
the only officer authorized to serve summons compelling appearance in federal court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c). This rule is sound, since the named defendant may not desire to
interpose a defense which might be noted by the Marshal.
3 § 25, 1 Stat. 117 (1790), 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1964); § 26, 1 Stat. 118 (1790), 22 U.S.C.§253 (1964).
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party defendant,4 but the question of the effect of service upon an
ambassador who is not named defendant, but is served only in his
capacity as agent of his government, has not been decided previously.'
Often, in the face of questions involving diplomatic immunity, the
party seeking to establish immunity for himself requests action in his
behalf by the United States State Department.6 Courts, although not
always bound to follow State Department advice," have generally ad-
hered to it.8 It is suggested that by doing so in the present case the
court extended the doctrine of diplomatic immunity beyond its proper
scope.
Recognizing the novelty of the question presented in the principal
case, the court relied heavily upon advice which it solicited from the
State Department on its own initiative. A Department letter to the
court' stated that, in the opinion of the Department, diplomatic immun-
ity would be violated by compulsory service of process upon a foreign
ambassador, and catalogued several possible consequences of permit-
ting such service. Included were hypothetical instances of a diplomat
feeling constrained to limit his movements in order to avoid finding
himself in the presence of a process server, detraction from the dip-
lomat's official duties entailed by the necessity to review legal conse-
quences of a summons, if served, and the embarrassment and humilia-
tion which a diplomat would occasion upon being handed a summons
by a process server. Mention was also made of possible retaliatory
actions taken in other countries in response to service of process upon
a diplomat by United States authorities. The court endorsed these
objections and concluded that the broad objectives of diplomatic im-
4 Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
5 ". . . [T]here is no general rule of international law, or United States law, ex-
pressly or impliedly prohibiting service of process upon a diplomatic agent so long as
he is not required to appear in court or is otherwise not prevented from performing his
duties." Griffin, Adjective Law and Practice in Suits Against Foreign Govcnenwts,
36 TEmPLE L.Q. 1, 12 (1962). A case with facts similar to those of the principal case,
United States ez rel Cardashian v. Snyder, 44 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1930), considered
the question of a U.S. Marshal's refusal to serve process upon the Turkish Ambassador
in his capacity as agent of his government. The reason given by the Marshal for his
refusal was that the diplomatic immunity of the Ambassador precluded such services.
Arguments that service was proper were not met by the court, which held that service
of process was precluded by the underlying sovereign immunity of the Turkish
government.
6 Examples of the manner in which this is done may be seen in 4 HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INT'L LAW § 401 (1942).
7 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 n.34 (1964) (dictum).
8 See M. Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: 7The Plaintiff Deserves a Day ins Court, 67
HARv. L. REv. 608, 615 (1954).
9 Letter of Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Advisor to the State Department, to Nathan
Paulson, clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir.), Jan. 13, 1965 (Partially
quoted, 345 F.2d at 980-81 n.5).
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munity, as envisioned in the preamble to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations,"° "to contribute to the development of friendly
relations among nations" and "to ensure the performance of the func-
tions of diplomatic missions," required a finding that diplomatic im-
munity would be violated by service of process in the principal case.
The announced rule of this case represents a broader view of the
protection afforded ambassadors and ministers than the usual view of
diplomatic immunity appears to warrant. The premises upon which
diplomatic immunity is usually predicated are expressed in the Restate-
ment, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, as follows:
The most widely accepted rationale for diplomatic immunity is that it
assures governments that they will not be hampered in their foreign
relations by harassment of, and interference with, their diplomatic repre-
sentatives. Protection of the performance of diplomatic functions re-
quires that those charged with such performance not be subject to
intimidation by persons in the receiving state. .... 11
The pertinent aspect of diplomatic immunity is, then, that such im-
munity is essentially designed as a guarantee of personal inviolabil-
ity. 2 It is not evident from the facts of the principal case that the
Tunisian Ambassador would have acted in any other capacity than as a
conduit between the serving authority and the Tunisian government.
The usual hazards to the official dignity of ambassadors contemplated
by the doctrine of diplomatic immunity were not present in the princi-
pal case.' 3 Delivery of a summons or other form of process which
requires no action by the ambassador, other than referral to his
government, does not appear to differ in any material way from other
types of communications given ambassadors. The extent to which his
government directs him to take action upon a summons is beyond the
purview of diplomatic immunity.' When seen in this light, service of
summons would not appear to offend even the broad view of diplomatic
10 Signed at Vienna, Austria, April 18, 1961. See 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 1064 (1962).
1" RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RE.LATIONS LAW § 76, comment a at 252 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962).
12 In Carbone v. Carbone, 123 Misc. 656, 206 N.Y.Supp. 40 (App. Div. 1924), the
court vacated service of arrest process, but refused to vacate a summons naming a diplo-
matic staff member as defendant because no personal distraint was involved. See also,
Griffin, supra note 5.
'1 For example, distraint of person or chattels of an ambassador, or interference
with freedom and performance of official duties. Distinctions have been recognized as
existing, in applying the doctrine of diplomatic immunity, between mere service of
process and body arrest or seizure of chattels. See Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian
Government, 203 App. Div. 740, 197 N.Y.Supp. 467 (1922).
14 Diplomatic immunity is a protection extended by the receiving state to the foreign
diplomat, and therefore, should not contemplate actions taken by the sending state
relative to its own agents.
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immunity propounded by the court." It is to be noted, also, that the
language extracted from the Vienna Convention upon which the court
based its rationale of diplomatic immunity did not, in its original con-
text, purport to serve as a rationale for diplomatic immunity but only
as a statement of the reasons for holding the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations."
The holding of the court in the principal case implies that a prospec-
tive litigant against a foreign state must seek alternative means to
obtain possible satisfaction of his claim. These alternatives may in-
clude (1) availability of a non-immune representative of the offending
government, (2) willingness of the diplomatic agent to accept service
of summons in behalf of his government, 7 and (3) utilization of diplo-
matic channels of communication to secure a reparation payment."
These means of remedy, however, would depend more upon fortuity
than upon the merits of the claim. In the absence of such alternatives,
the announced rule applies with equal force to United States citizens
as well as to other classes of prospective litigants seeking redress of
wrongs committed against them by foreign governmental enterprises.
The State Department is accountable, at least in part, for the
unfortunate precedent inherent in the present rule. It should be ob-
served that the expressed position of the Department, in its letter to
the court, effectively countermands the so-called "restrictive theory"
which the Department instituted in 1952'" to deal with the growing
number of cases in which sovereign immunity was being invoked by
foreign governments to avoid liability for wrongs committed while
acting in a commercial, nongovernmental role. The restrictive theory
would withhold Departmental recognition of sovereign immunity in
cases involving commercial acts of governments,"0 out of concern for
15 The view that any compulsory service of process violates diplomatic immunity
regardless of who is actually named as defendant is broader than that adopted by courts
in other countries. See Perrucchetti v. Puig y Cassauro, Court of Rome, June 6, 1928.
Foro Italiano I, 112 (1929). Ann. Dig. Case No. 247 (1927-28). Cited in Reply Brief
for Appellant, p. 9, Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965).36 Preamble, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, .supra note 10.
17 The court in the principal case indicated that the duty of ascertainment of the
possible willingness of the ambassador to accept service of summons lies with the
prospective plaintiff rather tlian with the serving authority. 345 F2d at 980 n.3.
is A dilemma likely to be encountered by those selecting this means is that their
failure to obtain judicial relief may have been attributable to the advice of the State
Department, as in the principal case. The injured party must then turn to the same
Department in order to have his claim presented through diplomatic channels.
19 Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the State Department, to Philip
B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952, in 26 DEP'T STATE Bur.L. 984, 985
(1952). For evaluations of the operative effects of the Tate Letter, see Comment, 60
MicH. L. Rv. 1142, 1145 (1961); 13 SYRAcusE L. RLy. 169, 170 (1961).
20 Merchant shipping, the activity from which the alleged wrong in the principal
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denial of justice to parties having legitimate claims against those
governments. The defense of sovereign, rather than diplomatic, im-
munity was the subject of the restrictive theory. However, extension
of the umbrella of diplomatic immunity to preclude service of summons
upon foreign governments, as in the principal case, has an effect
similar to that of sovereign immunity. Effective denial of justice results
as surely from an inability to serve process as it does from successful
pleading of sovereign immunity.21 Avoidance of such denials of justice
was the purported objective of the State Department in promulgating
the restrictive theory.22 However, the letter given to the court in the
principal case evinces a greater concern with hypothetical arguments
predicting damage to diplomatic relations if service is carried out, and
less concern with substantial justice for prospective plaintiffs, than
consistency with the restrictive theory would seem to permit. Further-
more, there is no reason to believe that the prevailing condition of
international relations would have been damaged to any greater extent
by the denial of diplomatic immunity in the principal case than by the
similar denial of sovereign immunity which would have been called for
by the restrictive theory.
The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that it is not
necessarily obligatory that federal courts follow State Department
advice in all matters.23 The principal case may be one in which the
court should not have followed the Department's advice. It is to be
noted that the court itself stated that:
There is little authority in international law concerning whether service
of process on a diplomatic officer as agent of his sending country is an
"attack on his person, freedom or dignity" prohibited by diplomatic
immunity. As diplomatic immunity exempts a person from the legal
case arose, was cited as exemplary of the sort of commercial activity which the State
Department felt no longer deserved the advantage of sovereign immunity merely by
virtue of the fact that it was government-owned. 26 DEFP'T STATE BuLL., op. cit. supra
note 19.
21 The position taken by the State Department on diplomatic immunity in the prin-
cipal case would have little effect on litigation if the early, absolute, theory of sovereign
immunity prevailed; even in the event service of summons was executed, sovereign
immunity could be immediately interposed to defeat the action. However, the present
policy of the Department and the courts on the subject of diplomatic immunity would
be a controlling factor in the outcome of this sort of litigation, since diplomatic im-
munity could be used to defeat claims against which sovereign immunity, under the
restrictive theory, would not be a valid defense. Griffin, supra note 5.
22 The restrictive theory was promulgated partially in accordance with an interna-
tional trend toward restriction of the scope of sovereign immunity, and partially in
response to recognition of the fact that U.S. nationals were being deprived of justice by
unavailability of the legal process due to sovereign immunity. 26 DP'T STATE BULL.,
op. cit. supra note 19.23 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 n.34 (1964) (dictum).
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processes necessary to ordered society and often deprives others of rem-
edies for harms they have suffered, courts hesitate to invoke the doctrine
in novel situations unless the purpose will certainly be served .... "'
This admission left the court free to grant the writ of mandamus com-
pelling service of summons. It is submitted that this approach would
have been preferable as avoiding unwarranted expansion of the doc-
trine of diplomatic immunity. At trial, cases such as the principal one
could still be disposed of upon grounds of sovereign immunity, the
appropriateness of the United States as a forum for international
disputes, or forum non conveniens,"5 while simultaneously preserving
substantial justice for United States litigants. As pointed out in the
dissenting opinion, arguments for declining to exercise jurisdiction
of United States courts to decide cases such as the principal one
should not preclude service of process upon the intended defendant,
since the matters of competence or jurisdiction are defenses to be
raised at the option of a defendant, and therefore are inapplicable to
a question of service of process.2"
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND COMPULSORY BLOOD
TRANSFUSION FOR ADULT JEHOVAH'S WITNESS
In two separate instances adult Jehovah's Witnesses were admitted
to hospitals with severe internal bleeding. Doctors in each instance
determined that blood transfusions were required to save the patient's
life. Each patient refused to consent to transfusions because of his
religious beliefs. In one case the patient, who had no minor children,
was pronounced incompetent, a conservator to consent to transfusion
was appointed by the court, and the transfusion was administered.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Held: An adult who
has no minor children cannot be compelled to take lifesaving blood
transfusions against his religious objection. In re Brooks' Estate,
32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).' The other case involved a
father of minor children who was a patient in a veterans' hospital.
On the hospital's application for an order to authorize the transfusion,
24345 F.2d at 980.
25I n the principal case, both of the intended parties to the suit were foreign entities,
and the alleged event occurred in foreign waters. The difficulties in procuring witnesses,
enforcing judgment, and other similar problems bring forth the question of whether a
U.S. court is the proper forum to decide such a dispute.
26345 F.2d at 979.
134 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 159 (1965); 44 TEXAS L. REv. 190 (1965).
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